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‘Struggling with language’
Indigenous movements for linguistic security and the politics
of local community
ROBERT LEE NICHOLS
University of Toronto
ABSTRACT In this article, I explore the relationship between linguistic diversity
and political power. Specifically, I outline some of the ways that linguistic diversity
has served as a barrier to the centralization of power, thus constraining, for example,
the political practice of empire-formation. A brief historical example of this
dynamic is presented in the case of Spanish colonialism of the 16th-century. The
article proceeds then to demonstrate how linguistic diversity remains tied to
struggles against forms of domination. I argue that in contemporary indigenous
movements for linguistic security, the languages themselves are not merely
conceived of as the object of the political struggle, but also as the means to preserve
a space for local action and deliberation – a ‘politics of local community’. I show
that linguistic diversity and the devolution of political power to the local level are
in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Finally, I consider the implications of this
thesis for liberal theorizing on language rights, arguing that such theory cannot fully
come to terms with this political-strategic dimension of language struggles.
KEY WORDS imperialism ● indigenous peoples ● liberal political theory ●
linguistic diversity
We are struggling with language.
We are engaged in a struggle with language.
L. Wittgenstein (1980: 11)
A HISTORICAL PORTRAIT OF LANGUAGE AND EMPIRE
When the masterpiece of the Castilian language, written by noted humanist
scholar Antonio de Nebrija, was presented to Spain’s Queen Isabella in
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1492, it could not have been known how prophetic its words would be.
Nebrija had penned his thoughts not only on the structure of Castilian, but
also on the concept of linguistic unification and the practice of empire-
building. Nebrija had the recent unification of Spain in mind, not the
colonization of America. Nevertheless, as word of the ‘discovery’ of the
‘New World’ soon spread, Nebrija’s words took on new significance. The
Gramática Castellana ‘crystallized the Castilian queen’s approach and set
forth a principle which succeeding Spanish monarchs were to try to adopt
in their official language policies at home and in Spain’s colonies’ (Heath,
1972: 6). Nebrija’s work was the ‘new guide, the new model of domination
for the emerging empire’1 of Europe (Ruán, 2002: 37). In summing up his
thoughts, Nebrija (1980: 97) reminded the Queen that ‘language has always
been the companion of empire’.2
Despite the experience that the Spanish Crown had in implementing a
unified language policy as an instrument of empire, it took a further 80 years
before the practice itself could be perfected in the colonial setting. At first,
it seemed the Spanish had learned nothing from their domestic experience
with language and politics. Columbus, for example, simply refused to
acknowledge that the indigenous peoples he encountered spoke different
languages at all. In his journal, he noted that his right to claim the land for
the Spanish Crown was secure, since the indigenous peoples did not contra-
dict him when he stated it so, ignoring of course that they did not under-
stand him. Columbus repeatedly failed to comprehend the fact of linguistic
diversity at all. As Todorov has written:
Columbus’s failure to recognize the diversity of languages permits him, when he
confronts a foreign tongue, only two possible, and complementary, forms of
behavior: to acknowledge it as a language but refuse to believe it is different; or
to acknowledge its difference but refuse to admit it is a language. (Todorov,
1999: 30)
This policy of willful ignorance allowed Columbus, and those who
immediately followed him, superficial control. The archetypal example of
this is the ‘Requirement’, a document of lawful possession, drafted in 1513
at the request of King Ferdinand. The ‘Requirement’ derived from a papal
bull issued by Pope Alexander II and mandated that the Indians submit to
the authority of the Catholic Church and allow the Spanish to preach the
Christian faith to them. If the Indians did not accept these terms, the
conquistadors were legally justified in conquest and violence. The Spanish
would, in this event, be mandated to ‘do all the harm and damage that we
can’ (text of the ‘Requirement’, quoted in Hanke, 1949: 33).
Of course, in order for the ‘Requirement’ to be anything other than a
conceptual absurdity, translation would have been necessary. The indigen-
ous peoples of the Americas, at the very least, would have had to have been
capable of understanding the text itself in order to have properly agreed (or
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disagreed) with its content. In the early stage of conquest, however, compre-
hension was not in the interest of the Spanish. Thus, the terms of the
‘Requirement’ – and the meagre measures of restraint it did impose on the
conquistadores – were often ignored. Hanke details how the ‘Requirement
was read to trees and empty huts when no Indians were to be found.
Captains muttered its theological phrases into their beards on the edge of
sleeping Indian settlements, or even a league away before starting the
formal attack’ (Hanke, 1949: 34). The verbal act itself was all that was
required; actual translation would have been a hindrance to the larger goal
of colonization.
The denial characteristic of both the ‘Requirement’ and Columbus’s
policies was not, however, politically effective. In refusing to acknowledge
the linguistic diversity of the Americas, the early conquistadores could not
take control over it. A policy that aggressively combated the linguistic
barrier would be needed if the Spanish were to conquer the indigenous
nations they confronted. The first stage of this linguistic control was the use
of indigenous peoples as translators. The most famous of these is Doña
Marina, also know as La Malinche, a persona who has lived on in Mexican
folklore as a complicated symbol of both mestizo pride and shame.3 One of
the conquistadores talks about Marina’s decision to join the Spanish and
work with them as ‘the great beginning of our conquests’ (quoted in Heath,
1972: 11).
The first policy regarding translation services in colonial Mexico was that
Indians were to learn Spanish; no Spaniards were to learn indigenous
languages. This policy, formalized in 1550 by King Philip II, was most often
carried out through a policy of kidnapping (Karttunen, 2000). However, this
had an unforeseen effect. It permitted communication between the Spanish
vice-royalty and the indigenous peoples, but it did nothing to reduce the
linguistic diversity of the continent itself and, furthermore, it placed the
power of the translator firmly in the hands of the Indians (Heath, 1972: 11;
Ligorred, 1992: 54). The Spanish humanist Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo,
writing in 1535, noted this problem and argued that without knowledge of
the indigenous languages, ‘the Christians were as if muzzled, asking
questions by signs; and being answered with signs, they gathered meaning
only by chance’ (quoted in Lerner, 2000: 283). The indigenous translators
soon learned that their control over this linguistic boundary between
colonizer and colonized put them in a privileged position. They grew in
wealth and status during this short era, drawing the resentment of many
Spaniards who were at a very real disadvantage. Historian Shirley Brice
Heath writes that:
[the] naguatlatos, or Indian translators, learned not only the conqueror’s tongue
but also his deceits. Interpreters assigned to local courts did not truthfully
translate Indians’ statements before judicial officials . . . Salaries of interpreters
were paid by local civil officials who found it to their advantage to place no
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curbs on Indian mediators who went about collecting their own salaries. (Heath,
1972: 12)
Naguatlatos were already well aware of the political power of translation,
since many of them came from the Aztec elite and, in the era prior to
European contact, had been instrumental in the linguistic practices of the
Aztec empire over its tributaries. Indeed, it is well noted that the Aztec
viewed the linguistic diversity of their tributaries as an obstacle to full
political control, and they sought to replace local languages with the
dominant Nahuatl.4 Nahuatl in 15th- and 16th-century Mexico was in a
comparable position to Latin in Europe5 (Mignolo, 2003: 54), ‘not only in
its use as a lingua franca, but also in its acceptance as the standard language
for science, art, and the education of the elite.’ (Heath, 1972: 4–5) The Aztec,
long before the Spanish, had realized the power inherent in destroying
local languages, both because it facilitated actual communication between
the centre and the peripheries, but also because the ‘destruction of the
accumulated knowledge and history of a people . . . offered the possibility
of rewriting history and reinventing knowledge’ (King, 1994: 37).6
As noted above, the original policy of employing indigenous translators
had ambiguous results from the Spanish perspective. The processes of trans-
lation were still in the hands of the Indians themselves, a fact that severely
hampered Spanish attempts at political control and religious conversion. As
long as linguistic diversity existed in Mexico, the Spanish conquistadores,
and the Aztec before them, could not gain full control over their subjects.
Even if there was one dominant language, as long as there were hundreds
(perhaps thousands) of others, the control over translation and education
could never be effectively wielded by the Spanish Crown. Indigenous
peoples themselves, from each linguistic group, would still possess a very
practical and powerful tool to distance themselves from the central political
power. This realization meant that the Spaniards soon began a campaign to
effectively eradicate linguistic diversity amongst the indigenous populations
under their control. They did this in the most efficient means possible, by
appropriating the imperial system already in place, set up by the Aztec.
Heath writes:
Faced with the plenitude of languages they met beyond the central valley of
Mexico, the regulars insisted the number of languages in New Spain had to be
reduced. They reasoned that if they continued the program begun by the Aztecs
of spreading Nahuatl, use of other Indian tongues would decline. (Heath, 1972:
23)
Recognizing that ‘there could never be enough polyglot missionaries to
ensure the “spiritual conquest” of New Spain’, Philip II came to see the
diversity of languages in New Spain as ‘a threat to the missionary effort and
the establishment of his sovereignty on a firm Catholic basis in the colony’
(Heath, 1972: 26; see also King, 1994: 43–5). Thus, by 1570, the Spanish
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Crown completely reversed its previous policy (Mignolo, 2003: 56). Nahuatl
was to become the official language of New Spain, and all Spaniards were
obligated to master it.
Of course, the Spanish wanted in the long run to force the indigenous
peoples to speak Castilian since, for them, it was the key to their religious
and cultural practices. However, there was another more immediate motive,
namely securing direct political control over the colonized. This required
the eradication of linguistic diversity through whatever means possible,
even if it didn’t lead directly to the increased use of Spanish; hence the
policy of enforcing Nahuatl on the population as a means to unify the
country linguistically. This new policy not only served to reduce the total
linguistic diversity of the region, it also shifted the power of translation into
the hands of the Spanish.A new class of bilingual Spaniards,mostly members
of the clergy, rose to pre-eminent positions in the vice-royalty,because ‘as the
linguistic barrier remained standing they were indispensable intermediaries
between the Indians and the civil officer, between their Orders and the
Episcopal authority. They were the lords and masters of their parishioners’
(Ricard, 1966: 52). The dominance of the clergy would not be broken until as
late as 1770, when the imposition of Spanish could finally be a realizable goal
and thus Charles II could decree a new language policy in the Americas that
no longer required the translation services of this educated elite (Lerner,
2000: 287). This was backed by the Archbishop of Mexico, Franciso Antion
Lorenzana y Buitrón, who, concerned with what he ‘perceived as the multi-
plication of Amerindian languages in the area of Mexico, Puebla, and
Oaxaca’ (Mignolo, 2003: 59), argued that ‘There has never been a Cultured
Nation in the World, that when it extended its Conquests, did not attempt
the same with its Language’ (quoted in Mignolo, 2003: 59).
CENTRALIZATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LOCAL
COMMUNIT Y
The brief sketch presented above is offered as a form of exemplary history
that allows some key theoretical insights to rise to the fore of any discussion
about the political significance of language policy and linguistic diversity.
As I attempted to demonstrate through the case of Spanish colonialism
(and, I think the same applies to the period of Aztec hegemony in the
15th-century), the practitioners of empire have in many cases understood
the negative relationship between linguistic diversity and the centralization
of political power. They have seen that ‘language has always been the
companion of empire’.
Despite the central place that language policy has played in the history
of colonialism and state formation, it seems to have received relatively
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scant normative theorizing. In this article, I hope to contribute to remedy-
ing this ‘striking gap’ (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003: 1) in the literature by
exploring some of the explicitly political dimensions to linguistic diversity.
In particular, I will be focusing on collective movements aimed at the
revival, maintenance or secure use of the languages of indigenous peoples.
Borrowing a term from Denise Réaume (1994), I will gather these
examples under the broad heading of ‘indigenous movements for linguis-
tic security’.
My contention here is that such movements may be aimed at the preser-
vation of a space for what Alasdair MacIntyre has called ‘the politics of local
community’. MacIntyre defines this as action and reflection ‘upon local
political structures, as these have developed through some particular social
and cultural tradition’. Such a politics allows for the opening of space in
which the local community ‘embodies and gives expression to an ordering
of different human goods and therefore also embodies and gives expression
to some particular conception of the human good’ (MacIntyre, 1998: 246–7).
In the space given to me below, I will explore how linguistic diversity may
help to preserve this kind of politics and to demonstrate that in indigenous
movements for linguistic security, the languages themselves are not merely
conceived of as the ends of the political struggle, but is also the means to
preserve such a space for local action and deliberation – for self-
determination conceived of in this broad sense. I will attempt to show that
linguistic diversity and the devolution of political power to the local level
are in a mutually reinforcing relationship. As power is local, so local
languages may flourish; as local languages flourish, so will there be pressure
to devolve power.
The work of James C. Scott is also helpful in bringing to light some of
the more important theoretical concepts at work in the relationship
between linguistic diversity and the politics of local community. Scott
(1998) has discussed the specific case of the linguistic unification in France
(which was most pronounced as an official policy in the mid to late 19th-
century) and its impact on local centres of political power. He writes in
regards to the ‘campaign of linguistic centralization’ that ‘[o]ne can hardly
imagine a more effective formula for immediately devaluing local knowl-
edge and privileging all those who had mastered the official linguistic code.
It was a gigantic shift in power’ (Scott, 1998: 72). More important,
however, are not the historical examples Scott provides, but rather the
theoretical framework that he illuminates for us. It is perhaps ironic that
Scott’s thesis on ‘legibility’ and centralized power has not been explicitly
discussed in the context of linguistic diversity. Indeed, Scott speaks of the
process of rendering local communities ‘legible’, ‘readable’ and ‘intellig-
ible’ in a predominantly metaphorical sense, yet the terms may take on
new importance if we consider them more literally. Consider the follow-
ing passage:
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Historically, the relative illegibility to outsiders of some urban neighbourhoods
(or of their rural analogues, such as hills, marshes, and forests) has provided a
vital margin of political safety from control by outside elites. A simple way of
determining whether this margin exists is to ask if an outsider would have
needed a local guide (a native tracker) in order to find her way successfully. If
the answer is yes, then the community or terrain in question enjoys at least a
small measure of insulation from outside intrusion . . . Illegibility, then, has been
and remains a reliable resource for political autonomy. (Scott, 1998: 54)
In the case of state powers seeking to comprehend the words and texts of
local communities by rendering their languages obsolete, we might think in
more literal terms about ‘legibility’ than even Scott intends. On this reading,
linguistic diversity may constitute the most persistent and obvious example
of such a ‘resource for political autonomy’, since negotiating local
communities with different languages requires a literal translation, and a
translator as a ‘local guide’.7
I have already touched on this relationship in the historical context of
Mexican colonization.8 But is it of relevance to contemporary indigenous
movements? Surely the political practices of domination and resistance at
play in 16th-century Mexico are of little assistance in illuminating 21st-
century realities. I suggest otherwise. I argue instead that linguistic diversity
is still intimately related to struggles for local community power. This is
particularly so in the case of indigenous communities residing within
dominant European-style states such as Canada, the United States, New
Zealand and Australia. In contemporary settings, the general notion that
linguistic diversity serves as a barrier to centralized power is still at play,
though the particulars of its functioning have changed (and indeed, vary
from place to place).
CONTEMPORARY STRUGGLES FOR LINGUISTIC SECURIT Y
The preservation of linguistic diversity may not only be desirable as a good
in itself;9 it is also a means to the realization of a politics of local community.
It therefore implicates the freedom and autonomy of indigenous peoples.
This may function in numerous ways, and I make no claims to an exhaustive
summary of them. Five of the more important political dynamics that I have
been able to identify in contemporary language struggles are offered below.
The first way in which linguistic diversity may serve the interests of
political action is through the existence of communicative barriers. The
ability to exclude outsiders from conversation and knowledge sharing is an
important part of wanting to preserve minority languages. Anthropologist
Donna Bonner (2001: 85) quotes a 32-year-old Garifuna women in Belize,
expressing her pleasure at this ability:
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Usually I say that whenever I talk [speak in Garifuna], they [members of other
ethnic groups] would want to know what I’m talking about . . . But they do not
know what I’m saying [Laugh]. I can gossip. I can say whatsoever I want to say,
and they just keep standing. I can curse. I can say funny things, and they do not
understand. They just stand there. I can say something funny about them and
they don’t understand [laughing]. They do not understand! All these funny
words. Ah ha. But they good words. Very good words.
This ‘sound power’ (Bonner, 2001: 85) is an important part of the political
interest at stake in the preservation of minority languages. Of course,
exclusive practices such as these are employed by dominant communities
all the time. As already noted, the requirement to read and write French
immediately excluded minority language communities outside of Paris and
allowed the French government to centralize power (May, 2001: 156–63;
Scott, 1998: 72). When employed by central powers, this exclusionary
practice is aimed in the long run at the reduction of linguistic diversity, since
it serves the interests of those in power to institutionalize their means of
communication as the only legitimate one. However, simply because it is
employed by dominant ethnic and linguistic communities should not blind
us to the fact that it may also be employed by minorities.
Secondly, there is a shift towards the increased autonomy of local
communities through the educational and employment benefits that flow
from language recognition. Stated bluntly, where indigenous languages are
recognized, indigenous peoples cannot be completely removed from the
larger processes of decision making surrounding their communities.
Mohawk scholar Kaia’titahkhe Annette Jacobs writes that before projects
to restore the Kanien’kéha (Mohawk) language were initiated, ‘the only
thing native in our schools was the children’ (Jacobs, 1998: 117). Ma¯ori
scholars have noted the same thing. What might initially be mistaken as a
purely symbolic claim to ‘preserve a language’ is a beginning of ‘a shift
toward Ma¯ori taking more control over the key decision-making and
organization of their own education’ (Smith, 2000: 65–6; see also May, 2001:
301). Whereas previously, Ma¯ori education policy had ‘almost always been
developed by Pakeha [non-Ma¯ori] administrators’ (Smith, 2000: 61), once
the language was recognized as a political fact, this was no longer possible
– it opened up space for the questioning of ‘Pakeha power and control . . .
exerted through selective decision-making, hegemonic influence, economic
control preferences, and so on’ (Smith, 2000: 62).
The full recognition of indigenous language rights implicates the
substantive content of education and knowledge transfer in a community.
To give a concrete example of this third political aspect, we might imagine
a school where an indigenous language is being revived. Not only will there
be more indigenous peoples teaching in this school, but the curriculum
itself will reflect indigenous values and interests better than one set by
non-indigenous peoples. Where indigenous languages exist and are affirmed
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– where they are the medium of education – indigenous peoples will be
involved in the setting of curriculum to a degree not required in a system
dominated by an outside language. This means a reduction in the assumed
superior status of non-indigenous educators (since they are simply not
equipped to build indigenous-language curriculum), and a subsequent
increase in the standing of indigenous educators (and elders). Thus, a
change in the medium of education will transform the content (Leavitt,
1995). In the case of bilingual Navajo-English programmes developed in
Arizona, the Navajo portion of the educational content was developed by
people in the community: with their stories, their input, their style of
learning and teaching. The TESL (teaching English as a second language)
material, by contrast, formed at UCLA, was perceived as ‘rigid’, ‘remedial’
and focused on ‘specific Anglo experience’ and material that included
almost exclusively pictures of ‘a White family dressed in clothes reminiscent
of illustrations in the “Dick and Jane” readers’ (McCarty, 2002: 96–8). It is
a simple fact that if indigenous languages are encouraged, this will impli-
cate the substantive content of education and knowledge transfer, allowing
for greater contributions from indigenous peoples themselves.
The increased local autonomy and responsibility that comes with devolv-
ing power over language-related realms of activity (especially school) may
have a fourth effect. In places where linguistic diversity has been affirmed,
and power over related realms has been devolved, indigenous peoples
express an increased sense of empowerment and capacity to realize their
own agency. Ma¯ori writer Graham Hingangaroa Smith argues:
the revolution of 1982 [the establishment of Te Kohanga Reo; independent,
parent-driven, Ma¯ori language preschools] may be significant not so much as a
language revitalization initiative, but as a major shift in the thinking of Ma¯ori
people with respect to no longer waiting for a ‘benevolent’ Pakeha society to
deliver on Ma¯ori aspirations. On the contrary, they assumed increased
responsibility for developing the social transformation of their own lives.
(Smith, 2000: 64)
This suggests that teaching in one’s own language may have an important
effect of empowering the teachers, as well as the students, to shed negative
images of themselves by enabling them to regain control over their own
lives (Dejean, 1999).10 This increased empowerment is politically relevant
since it tends to ‘cascade’ into wider and wider realms of life. Just as Ma¯ori
preschool programmes ‘led to similar resistance initiatives all the way up
the education ladder’ (Smith, 2000: 65), so too may the developing of
models of resistance move completely beyond the narrow realm of
education and schooling (generally the first and most directly impacted
realm of movements to revive indigenous languages). Augie Fleras (1993:
31) confirms the ‘cascade effect’ of the language revitalization movement in
Aotearoa/New Zealand:
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The social impact and policy implications have been nothing short of startling:
the Kohanga Reo has resulted in (a) the politicization of aboriginal issues in a
relatively unthreatening manner; (b) the legitimation of aboriginal claims as
valid and necessary in a bicultural society; (c) the presentation of aboriginal
demands on terms that central policy structures can relate to; and (d) the
mobilization of the Ma¯ori public around the principle of Ma¯ori 
self-determination.
Referring again to the case of Navajo language revival, the school was seen
as an epicentre for larger political transformations in relations between
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. The school, ‘not only not an
indigenous institution but a historically repressive one’ was suddenly trans-
formed into an ‘agent of community empowerment’ (McCarty, 2002: 99). In
this same case, once Navajo community members were more directly
involved in the education of their own children due to demands for Navajo-
speakers, they began to question larger problems in Navajo–US relations,
such as the community’s ‘utter dependence on government funding’ (Fettes,
1992: 19, quoting Fishman, 1991). In this case, the community began to
demand further resources from the Federal government, resources that
were eventually cut back rather than extended, resulting in the demise of
the language revival programmes (Fettes, 1992: 19).
The final way in which contemporary language claims may be seen as
part of a larger process of political transformation is in the way they alter
the demands placed on non-indigenous peoples exterior to the community.
One of the key features of asymmetrical power relations is that the minority
communities pay disproportionately the costs of intercultural exchange.
The existence and recognition of linguistic diversity within colonial states
may help to shift some of this burden onto the non-indigenous peoples. The
best example of this lies with the implications of linguistic diversity for
centralized bureaucracies. In the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand for
example, the fact of official language status for Ma¯ori (established in 1987)
has meant that non-Ma¯ori people working in the Ministry of Ma¯ori
Development are encouraged to learn some of the indigenous language.
This requires the non-Ma¯ori staff to go and live in a Ma¯ori community and
be taught by Ma¯ori people. As of 2001, approximately 30,000 non-Ma¯ori
people spoke the Ma¯ori language and the Government of New Zealand
(2003) has recently identified increasing this number as a priority. The same
situation can be found in the local bureaucracy of Nunavut, Canada, where
English- or French-speaking administrators from the south are encouraged
to learn some Inuktitut as a means to career advancement. Where linguis-
tic diversity flourishes, non-indigenous peoples are pressed to learn more
about indigenous peoples’ communities, and to bear some of the burdens
of intercultural exchange.
ETHNICITIES 6(1)36
37
THEORIZING INDIGENOUS STRUGGLES
To this point, I have ventured to demonstrate two things. First, the capacity
of colonized peoples to speak languages that differed from those of the
colonizing forces around them has been used to subvert the logic of
imperialism in very practical ways. Those in a position of dominance have
tended to recognize the power implicated in linguistic barriers and have
sought to remove these obstacles to render colonized peoples more legible
to centralized control. This process has been aimed at facilitating the
movement of knowledge, people, and power flowing between the center and
the periphery. It has also been used to assimilate the colonial subject in an
attempt to erase the distance between center and periphery. To this end,
linguistic diversity has been attacked by colonizers. This was illustrated
through the historical case of 16th-century Mexico.
Second, I asked whether movements for the use, maintenance and revival
of indigenous languages in contemporary settings can be seen to exhibit
some of these same dynamics. In particular, I’ve argued that such move-
ments are, in part, aimed at opening up spaces for a politics of local
community – that is, the spaces of self-determination centred on the most
local level of politics: the school, the church, the community centre. We have
seen how the space away from centralized power afforded by linguistic
diversity is manifested in new ways in the contemporary setting of the
liberal nation state (drawing primarily from the cases of Aotearoa/New
Zealand, Canada, and the United States). These movements have chal-
lenged asymmetrical power relations in quiet ways – by giving indigenous
peoples greater control over the education of their children, by excluding
non-indigenous peoples from certain spaces, and by inviting non-indigenous
peoples into communities on more equal grounds (to name only a few of
the examples listed above). In short, movements for linguistic security have
been, in central ways, movements for political change, agency and freedom.
If it is right to state that there is an inverse relationship between linguis-
tic diversity and the centralization of power, and if it is right to claim that
movements for linguistic security are aspects of larger political struggles,
then the challenge now is to incorporate these themes into contemporary
theorizing on language rights and language policy. To this end, I propose
now to examine how contemporary political theory may, or may not,
accommodate such concepts. It is my contention in this final section that
much of contemporary theorizing on language in political philosophy has
not been sufficiently attentive to this political aspect of linguistic survival
strategies and, as a result, we run the risk of curtailing the struggles of
indigenous peoples unnecessarily.
Political philosopher Alan Patten has offered ‘sustained normative
reflection’ (2001: 692) on the nature of language policy within the broader
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framework of the literature surrounding multiculturalism that has been pre-
eminent in political theory for the last 20 years or so. Patten identities two
main problems that have arisen from language politics: that of public
recognition and individual linguistic autonomy. He writes:
According to my terminology, a language enjoys public recognition when it is
possible to access public services and/or conduct public business in that
language . . . An individual enjoys linguistic autonomy, I will say, to the extent
that he is free from state interference to select which language he will use in
various non-public domains and which of the publicly recognized languages he
will use in various public domains. (Patten, 2001: 692)
Patten then identifies three different policy models used to respond to the
challenges posed by these two language-based claims. These models are,
‘official multilingualism,’ ‘language rationalization’, and ‘language mainten-
ance’ (Patten, 2001: 693–4). After discussing the merits and weaknesses of
the other two models, eventually Patten declares that ‘the official multi-
lingualism model . . . is the most ethically appropriate default position and
thus the one to opt for except where some sufficiently strong challenge to
it can be mounted’, and, importantly for him, it ‘embodies an attractive idea
of equality that is central to much contemporary liberal thought’ (Patten,
2001: 694–5). On the surface of it, this seems to encapsulate much of the
political dimension of indigenous movements for linguistic security. But
first we must inquire into what justifies such a multilingual model.
Following Kymlicka’s work on culture, Patten identities three primary
interests in language. These include communication, symbolic affirmation
and identity promotion (Patten, 2001: 695).11 Patten reminds us that
[t]he first and most obvious good that is achieved through recognition of some
language L is accommodation of the communication needs of L-speakers who
lack fluency in any of the other languages that are used in public settings . . . In
general, those who cannot, because of their linguistic capabilities, access public
services or participate meaningfully in the conduct of public business will
encounter more obstacles to achieving their ends and are vulnerable to having
their rights and interests overlooked. (Patten, 2001: 695–6)
An obvious example of a claim based on the communication interest would
be the right of minority language speakers to have court proceedings trans-
lated for them if they are on trial, where the language of the court is not
intelligible to them.
Symbolic affirmation is based on the belief that ‘[b]eing offered a service
or having some piece of public business conducted in one’s language is for
many a sign of consideration and respect’ (Patten, 2001: 696). Here, Patten
borrows from Charles Taylor’s work by pointing out that ‘[e]njoying the
consideration and respect of others, in turn, seems crucial to developing a
full sense of one’s own worth and an undistorted sense of one’s agency and
identity’ (Patten, 2001: 696; Taylor, 1993, 1994).12 He might have also added
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the negative corollary to this, that misrecognition does not just show ‘a lack
of due respect’, but may actually constitute ‘a grievous wound, saddling its
victims with a crippling self-hatred’ (Taylor, 1994: 26). Under this heading,
we might imagine a workspace with Anglophones and Francophones
working together, all of whom are bilingual, but who never speak French
since the Anglophones are numerically dominant. There would be no
communicative interest in speaking French, since English would be
intelligible to all, but there might be an interest based on symbolic
affirmation.
The final interest Patten identifies, identity promotion, makes the
strongest claim. Patten writes that because ‘language is a central and
defining feature of identity,’ that members of a community may identify one
another based on their language, then the promotion of language rights may
be in the interests of the long-term ‘survival and flourishing’ of the group
itself (Patten, 2001: 697). The classic example of this can again be found in
Taylor, where he speaks of the Québécois aspiration to ‘assuring that future
generations continue to identify as French-speakers’ (Taylor, 1994: 59).
If, according to Patten, these are the grounds on which language-based
claims are made, where do we place indigenous movements for linguistic
security? They clearly are not advanced on the basis of a ‘communicative
interest’, since this tends towards linguistic unification, not diversification.
In the case, for example, of a language claim advanced in a courtroom
setting, translation may solve the problem and satisfy the claim, but a long-
term policy of linguistic assimilation would solve the problem in an even
more effective manner.
Furthermore, as I have tried to demonstrate above, such movements
cannot be reduced to a symbolic affirmation interest, since they are often
aimed at the enlargement of a space for a politics of local community away
from the dominant state. They are about gaining autonomy from the need
to derive one’s agency from state affirmation at all. More will be discussed
about this dynamic below.
Finally, I do not think they can be called solely ‘identity promotion’
movements either, since they do not aim only at ‘future generations’, but
also at realigning power asymmetries here and now. One of the unfortunate
(and undoubtedly unintended) legacies of Taylor’s influence on the
literature is that often minority language claims have been discussed as
primarily orientated towards the survivance of the language itself (1994:
58). What I have been trying to demonstrate, however, is that there are real
and immediate political implications to language claims that cannot be
reduced to such a formulation. As such, indigenous movements for linguis-
tic diversity defy constriction within the current formulation of a typology
of claims.
This is a case, one might argue, for expanding the typology, not for
discarding it altogether. Perhaps we should add something like a ‘political
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empowerment’, or ‘power realignment’ interest to linguistic claims. I still
don’t think this would be adequate, however, since the typology of rights is,
prior to the breakdown of claims, already circumscribed by a larger demand
that would per se rule out the kind of political dynamic to which I am trying
to give theoretical voice. In order to observe this, let us return to Patten.
A typology of rights envisioned by Patten, and others, has as its larger
aim the circumscribing of claims that are legitimate to liberal theory. That
is to say, the overriding concern is with facilitating equality, conceived of as
within the bounds of the liberal-democratic state. Patten’s otherwise robust
theory of language rights places limits on the degree to which these claims
may extend on the grounds that they must lead to:
institutional arrangements that enhance equality of opportunity and reduce social
exclusion, facilitate discussion between all citizens and make democracy more
responsive to deliberation, encourage a shared political identity fostering civic
virtues and dispositions, and make for a more efficient public sector, one that
frees up time and resources for allocation to other priorities. (Patten, 2001: 702)
In a context whereby state language policy or minority language claims
do not facilitate these kinds of institutional arrangements, these policies and
claims would not be justified and, instead, we would be forced to consider
‘linguistic rationalization’ (read assimilation). In the end, however, Patten
argues that the institutionalization of language rights does not violate these
primary (liberal) principles, and thus a policy of official multilingualism and
language maintenance need not be illiberal. He reassures us that ‘[t]he
advantages associated with linguistic convergence can be secured without
actual convergence if and to the extent that some or all of a number of
conditions are met’ (i.e. widespread translation services, institutional
completeness within linguistic communities, etc.). Furthermore, he writes:
[i]t is far from clear that denying recognition to some particular language
would encourage speakers of that language to integrate into a common identity
with majority-language speakers. Even if nonrecongition did bring about a
language shift, the identity difference may survive or even be magnified by the
way in which this is done . . . Paradoxically, the best way to promote a common
identity is sometimes to allow difference to flourish. (Patten, 2001: 704–513)
The end goal, in each of the three interests described by Patten – indeed, in
any legitimate language claim – is the promotion of a common identity and
the integration of citizens within the larger state.
What I want to suggest now is that such a liberal theory of language
rights is very helpful for coming to terms with certain claims, but is limited
for understanding indigenous movements for linguistic security, since many
such movements, as we have seen, are not aimed at the goal of further
integration into the dominant society at all. In fact, in many cases, linguis-
tic security movements facilitate the creation of a ‘space away’ from the
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state structure. Richard Day has also commented on how ‘speaking only
about the inclusion of all groups within a single society’ can lead to a mis-
understanding of the claims of indigenous peoples and the failure ‘to fully
grasp the existence of relations of power that exist between disparate
identities. This theory therefore cannot comprehend a situation where a
group might desire greater autonomy from, rather than greater integration
within, a dominant form of social life such as a white settler state’ (Day,
2001: 176). This is due, in part, to the fact that, from the standpoint of the
suppressed peoples, the problem of preserving linguistic diversity only comes
about as a result of the historical fact of a colonizing power that takes assimi-
lation as one of its key means of establishing domination (Tully, 2005). Only
by setting linguistic claims within this historical context (as I have alluded to
above) can we see the specifically political anti-imperial nature of these
claims. Otherwise, the claims appear to be relatively apolitical in relation to
the ‘backdrop’ of the colonial state. This de-politicizing of movements for
linguistic security therefore serves to legitimize the original (and, too often,
ongoing14) colonial practices that created the‘problem of declining diversity’
in the first place. As Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (1996: 130) has argued:
[one way] of making languages disappear at the same time as the State retains
its legitimacy in the eyes of most of its citizens and the international community,
seems to be for a state to observe, or to be seen as observing, several of the
basic human rights for all of its citizens including minorities, but to deny the
minorities those human rights which are most central for reproducing a minority
group as a distinctive group, namely, linguistic and cultural human rights.
The colonial state is the generator of the inequalities that lead to a decline
in linguistic diversity and the more general assimilation of indigenous
peoples. Only once we recognize this can we begin to see languages, as
Feldman (2001: 168) argues we should see other beliefs and practices: ‘as
intimate parts of the struggle with the state and of cultural survival, rather
than remnants of the past handed down through the generations’. In this
respect, then, indigenous movements for linguistic diversity may be aimed
at a much more transformative process than current liberal theory can
allow, and the process of de-linking movements for linguistic security from
the historical processes that create the ‘crises’ in the first place may itself
contribute to the problem.15
I do not mean to imply that political theorists have been unaware of how
language-based claims may distance minority communities from the
dominant form of social life. However, because political theorists (from
differing traditions) have been mostly concerned with the possibly negative
implications of this, they have failed to see its important positive use in the
case of indigenous peoples. The issue has been approached either from the
perspective of Kymlicka’s ‘internal restrictions’ or in the terminology of
‘social mobility’. David Laitin and Rob Reich sum up the first of these:
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Such measures [for language preservation] do indeed protect the ability of adult
members of national minorities to exercise their freedom within their societal
cultures. But they also require coercive restraints on the children of these same
adults, for their opportunities to learn the language of some broader societal
culture will be curtailed. With respect to children, then, external protections can
become internal restrictions. (Laitin and Reich, 2003: 91–2)16
The fear being expressed in such a statement is that the very process of
‘distancing’, which is embedded in movements for linguistic security, may
unjustly restrict the interests of children. Thus, in this formulation, the
politically transformative effects of indigenous language movements may
per se be inadmissible to a liberal typology of rights, since they do not
necessarily further the ability of children to access the broader societal
culture.
The second way this logic unfolds is via the terminology of ‘social
mobility’, a formulation of the argument that attracts a surprising range of
theorists. Jacob Levy argues that because communicative range matters in
determining the social mobility of children, ‘then we must often admit that
language preservation policies are not in children’s interests’ (Levy, 2003:
239). Joseph Carens reminds us that because, in Canada, no indigenous
languages are spoken by millions of people, ‘no aboriginal person can
routinely expect to communicate with doctors, lawyers, dentists, bureau-
crats, television technicians, and so on in her native language, much less to
find employment in that language in the economy outside the reserve’.
Consequently, ‘[t]here is a deep tension, which aboriginal people experience
daily, between secure access to their cultures (which are themselves threat-
ened in various ways by the forces of modernization) and access to other
primary goods like income, wealth, opportunities, and power’ (Carens, 2000:
60).17 Finally, Thomas Pogge extends and expands the logic, arguing that
such a position cannot hold only for indigenous peoples and their
languages, but is true of Hispanics, and possibly all minority language
communities. He writes that ‘a public education in a minority language –
and one that, by assumption, is endangered in the US – is not equal, because
it does not give children the same opportunities to participate in the social,
economic, and political life of this country’ (Pogge, 2003: 116). Later,
arguing for a principle of English First,18 Pogge states that because ‘the
most important linguistic competence for children now growing up in the
US is the ability to communicate in English’, all educational programmes
in the United States (and by the logic of the argument, one could extend
the realm much further) must therefore be developed ‘by reference to the
goal of effectively helping pupils develop fluency in English’ (Pogge, 2003:
118–9).19
Even coming from the perspective of democratic deliberative theory, we
may hear this tone. Consider the limiting function employed in the follow-
ing quote from Seyla Benhabib:
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I would suggest that under principles of discourse ethics, any educational system
that denies the exposure of children to the most advanced form of knowledge
and inquiry available to humankind is unjustifiable . . . The obligation of the
liberal-democratic state is to protect not only ‘the social mobility’ of its young
. . . but their equal right to develop their moral and intellectual faculties as full
human beings and future citizens as well. (Benhabib, 2002: 123)
What these theorists have in common, besides a generally liberal frame-
work of thought, is their sincere desire to protect the interests of vulnerable
people within minority groups; hence the concern for the social mobility of
children. This concern is of great importance and the increasingly central
place that children play in contemporary political theory is to be applauded.
However, framing the discussion of indigenous movements for linguistic
security within this terminology has the unfortunate consequence of
obscuring some of the most important elements of the issue.
There are many possible objections to the ‘social mobility’ argument as
it is deployed against movements for linguistic security.20 Rather than
rehearse them all, I want to focus on one problem that is central to the
claims of indigenous peoples. Put simply, checking the justness of indigen-
ous movements for linguistic security against the test of social mobility
within the dominant society is inappropriate, since the colonial context in
which indigenous peoples find themselves means that many of these move-
ments – as I have attempted to demonstrate above – are specifically aimed
at creating a space away from the dominant society itself. If indigenous
peoples must prove how their movements facilitate the integration of their
children into the dominant society around them, this has the consequence
of legitimating, and even facilitating, the colonial context of oppression and
domination itself. Consider again Benhabib’s comments above and, in
particular, her concern for the development of ‘future citizens’. The
question is: citizens of what community? If the dominant European-style
nation state is assumed as the community, then language-based
programmes must be orientated towards the development of good citizens
within such a community. But, as I have demonstrated above, indigenous
movements to linguistic security don’t always facilitate such development.
In fact, at times, they are specifically designed to disrupt such development.
This is not to say that they, by necessity, restrict the development of good
citizens, but often they are orientated towards the development of good
Cree, or Maya, or Navajo citizens, and rightly so.21
In the case of indigenous peoples, language may be both the object of the
practices, and the means – a right and a resource (Kontra et al., 1999). In
other words, it may not be simply the use, preservation and revival of
indigenous languages that are facilitated by such movements, but also the
use, preservation and revival of local centres of self-determination, in which
communities may debate and develop alternative conceptions of the
common good to overlap with, complement, and at times, rival those of the
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dominant society. Indigenous movements based upon these local centres of
self-determination belie our attempts to fix democratic practices within a
set taxonomy of rights, or along a ladder that supposedly could result in ‘the
end of history’ (Thornberry, 2002). As long as we view language politics
within these kinds of frameworks, as primarily orientated towards the
development of good citizens within a single political community and a
single conception of the common good, we will, I believe, fail to do justice
to the claims of indigenous peoples.
TOWARDS A PRAXIS OF LISTENING
But there are language games in which the important thing is to listen, in which
the rule deals with audition. Such a game is the game of the just. And in this
game, one speaks only insomuch as one listens, that is, one speaks as a listener,
and not as an author. (J-F. Lyotard, 1985: 71–2)
By way of conclusion, I would like to comment on the broader relevance of
the reflections presented above. If I have succeeded, albeit in a limited way,
in demonstrating some of the unique aspects of indigenous movements for
linguistic security, the general importance of such a demonstration may still
be in question. It may be argued that the claims of indigenous peoples
constitute too narrow a case to be of much relevance to theorizing on
language and politics. One might say, ‘that’s fine for them, but what about
the other 99 percent of cases?’
The placing of indigenous peoples’ politics as central to theoretical
discussions of linguistic security seems appropriate to me. To put it more
forcefully, I think that questions of language rights, linguistic diversity and
the political legacy of colonialism cannot be clearly separated from each
other. Historically informed study of the relationship between language and
colonialism helps us not only to understand how we arrived at the present
situation, but also what may be the appropriate actions out of it. This
historical political dimension of language politics is, surprisingly, rarely
commented on.22 Furthermore, I think we must consider that, of the 6000
or so languages spoken today,23 only 1.5 percent are officially recognized by
nation states (May, 2001: 5). Of this 1.5 percent, only a small portion are
recognized at the state level.24 Given that indigenous peoples are the
bearers of the vast diversity of the world’s languages, and given that official
recognition of these languages is so rare, it seems important that indigen-
ous peoples themselves should be central to thinking and acting on the
issue.
Finally, I think that by examining how language-based movements and
the maintenance of linguistic diversity may implicate a politics of local
community, we are led to consider implications beyond the realm of
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indigenous peoples. For if I have made the case convincingly that linguistic
diversity implicates a politics of local community, then the circle of inter-
ested and affected parties to the question is widened. Indigenous move-
ments for linguistic security, insofar as they foster a space for local
self-determination, are of importance not only to minority language
speakers, but to all who live in communities struggling to maintain (or
regain) the capacity to realize their conceptions of the common good. Such
movements touch on all who are interested in having some effective say in
the social, cultural, and political life of the community in which they live. It
is, therefore, perhaps wisest for non-indigenous peoples, at least for a
moment, to stop and listen to the practical experience that indigenous
communities have developed through their struggles to regain a space for
local self-determination. With this in mind, I end by recalling the challenge
put forward by Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson for a political theory
‘predicated upon a praxis of listening’ (Simpson, 2000: 114).
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Notes
1 My translation: ‘la Gramática de Nebrija es la nueva pauta, el nuevo modelo de
dominio para el imperio naciente’.
2 My translation: ‘siempre la lengua fue compañera del imperio’.
3 For a discussion of the place of Malinche in Mexican history and culture, see
Pratt (1993). Paz (1959) remains a key (if also problematic) text in understand-
ing how the myth of Malinche plays out in modern Mexican culture and politics.
4 For essays on pre-contact language policies in the Americas, see Boone and
Mignolo (1994).
5 One Spanish chronicler is even quoted as having said: ‘This Mexican language
is the common tongue which runs through all the provinces of Spain, inasmuch
as there are innumerable languages within each province, and even within
sections of each village. Moreover, throughout all parts of New Spain there are
interpreters who understand and speak Nahuatl, since this language is spread
here just as Latin is through all the realms of Europe’ (Heath, 1972: 4).
6 Lerner (2000: 209) has noted the use of the Quechua language served a similar
function in maintaining the dominance of the Inca over their tributaries.
7 Though I cannot discuss it here, this may be doubly the case when considering
barriers between languages that are predominantly oral, and ones that are
written. Scott touches on this when he discusses idea that ‘oral cultures, as
opposed to written cultures, may avoid the rigidity of orthodoxy’ (1998: 332).
8 It should be noted that the recognition that linguistic diversity stands in
opposition to centralized power has been a feature of many imperial projects,
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in many places, in many times. This ‘linguistic imperialism’ is by no means
unique to European colonization of the Americas and I am not implying that
there is something about American indigenous peoples that makes them
particularly adept at recognizing and employing language as a political tool of
resistance. Although it cannot be discussed here, this dynamic was surely a
feature of European state formation and the process of ‘internal colonization’,
as well as colonial practices elsewhere in the world. For contemporary examples
of this dynamic related to the hegemonic position of English, see Pennycook
(1994, 1998) and Crowley (2003).
9 The claim to the inherent worth of a language is a controversial one and
something I will not try to pick up here. This question has been the primary
focus of the ‘linguistic preservationist’ theorists in (predominantly) linguistics
and anthropology. The claim is that each language is a unique human artifact
that should be preserved for its inherent beauty and worth, and insofar as it adds
to the diversity and complexity of human life. On this debate, see Crystal (1997,
2000). I am deliberately leaving this argument to the side and focusing on some
of the political implications of linguistic diversity, since they seem, to my eye
anyway, to have been ignored. Though I am not a linguist, it appears from my
vantage point as though the debate there has at times focused on gaining
clarification about what a language is, rather than on the economic and political
status of its speakers. A notable exception is May (2001).
10 What is interesting about this case, from a political theory perspective, is that it
differs in important ways from the concept of agency described in recognition
theory flowing from Taylor (1994). In Taylor, the confirmation of one’s agency
derives from a network of recognition from others. He then moves from this
Hegelian premise to the contemporary liberal state, arguing for a ‘politics of
recognition’ that would have the state recognize the particularity of internal
groups and peoples. What is not challenged in Taylor, however, is that the state
should be the ‘recognizer’ and that the confirmation of one’s agency should be
dependent at all upon the state (especially if one takes the legitimacy of the
state itself to be the site of contestation, as is the case with many indigenous
peoples). This has prompted Richard Day (2001) to ask of the ‘gift’ of recog-
nition, ‘who is this we that gives the gift?’ Elizabeth Povinelli (2002) makes a
similar point in the context of Australian multiculturalism and indigenous
peoples there. It seems to me that what is different about the Ma¯ori case as
articulated above is that the confirmation of agency derived, in part, from
ignoring the state, from going behind its back, and from a diminished need of
official recognition.
11 For his part, Jacob Levy has placed language-based claims into two larger
groups: assistance rights and symbolic rights. The right to a language as an
‘assistance right’ is claimed in the interest of further integration and social
mobility within the dominant (Levy, 1997: 29). Language-based claims are
offered as ‘symbolic claims’ when the language itself is important to the identity
of the minority community (Levy, 1997: 46–7). In effect, then, Levy collapses
Patten’s distinction between an interest in ‘symbolic affirmation’ and ‘identity
promotion’.
12 For how this conception of agency may be problematic, see note 7.
13 See also Kymlicka and Patten (2003: 13).
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14 We might recall that, at least in Canada, the last residential schools, key tools of
assimilation and domination, were not closed until the mid-1980s. See Miller
(1996) and Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996), especially Chapter
10.
15 Fleras (1993: 31) notes in a comparison between the struggles for linguistic
security in Canada and Aotearoa/New Zealand that the relative failure of the
Canadian case is due to a ‘failure to politicize the aboriginal language crisis or
to engage in issue-linkage’.
16 The emphasis on ‘within’ in the passage above is mine, and I think it relevant
that Laitin and Reich would frame the interests of the adults in terms of
freedom within their own societal culture and not freedom relative to the
dominant one.
17 There are, however, indigenous languages in other countries, such as Mexico,
that have a speaking community of over a million, and Carens is surprisingly
silent on the question of why indigenous languages have so few speakers in
Canada. This ‘deep tension’ that aboriginal peoples have to face is part of the
disproportionate cost of intercultural exchange that I have tried to elucidate
above. For a recent review of the state of Aboriginal languages in Canada, see
Kirkness (1998).
18 Pogge (2003: 221) also argues that this policy will ‘bring together all those who
genuinely care about the children whose lives our education system will shape
so profoundly.’
19 Rob Reich suggests that even this principle may not be sufficiently strong. For
Reich, group rights ‘may serve to incarcerate children within a cultural group’
(2005: 338) and therefore the devolving of such rights, especially over education
and schooling can only be justified when they cultivate a particular liberal
citizen who will be fully capable of exercising his or her ‘right to exit’ the
community. He goes on to argue for an education that ‘does not indoctrinate,
that does not systematically adapt one’s preferences, and, over time, one’s very
character to uphold cultural norms’ (Reich, 2005: 346). However, Reich is
unclear how it is that liberal education does not adapt the preferences and
character of children, while other kinds of education do.
20 The most common objection is that claims to ‘social mobility’ as a limit on
language preservation tend to assume that parents of minority communities are
not interested in the social mobility of their own children, and that bilingual
learning is somehow restrictive. In fact, we now know that children of minority
language communities learn the dominant language better through bilingual
education (as opposed to complete immersion), thus local language initiatives,
when they are orientated towards such a goal, may actually enhance, in some
cases, the social integration of children into the dominant society. See May
(2001). While this argument is important in some contexts, such as the situation
of certain immigrant communities in Canada or the United States, it is not
adequate for indigenous peoples, for the reasons explained above.
21 Along these lines, we may also question Taylor’s insistence that ‘[t]he struggle
for recognition can find only one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of
reciprocal recognition among equals’ (1994: 50, my emphasis).
22 In a recent edited volume on language rights and political theory that is long
overdue and very helpful in other ways (Kymlicka and Patten, 2003), only one
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article (Blake, 2003) takes the ‘historical fact of empire’ as important to under-
standing the politics of language rights in the contemporary setting.
23 Such statistics are notoriously unreliable, both because the definition of a
‘language’ (as distinct from a dialect) is fluid, and because many of the world’s
least spoken languages are those of peoples in remote communities who, for
reasons discussed above, may resist being fully ‘indexed’ by linguists and
anthropologists. For a discussion on the variability of these statistics, and the
number of 6000 languages, see Crystal (2000: 2–3).
24 May (2001: 293) states that Ma¯ori is the only indigenous language with official
state recognition. This is not quite correct as there are others, such as Guaraní
in Paraguay. As well, the languages of several indigenous nations have been
recently accorded recognition at local or regional levels. Examples include
Inuktitut in Nunavut (Canada) and Sámi in parts of Scandinavia. I owe these
examples to the anonymous reviewers at Ethnicities.
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